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Leaving Judicial Review with the 
Judiciary: The Misplaced Role of 
Agency Deference in Tunney Act 
Public Interest Review 
Alexandra P. Clark* 
Abstract 
This Note explores the Tunney Act’s mechanism for judicial 
review of consent decrees negotiated by the U.S. Department of 
Justice and merging parties to remedy alleged antitrust issues. 
The Tunney Act requires that the reviewing court only approve a 
consent decree if it is “in the public interest.” This Note argues, 
however, that courts have improperly circumscribed their review 
by affording too much deference to the Department of Justice 
when reviewing these consent decrees. This deference subverts 
Congress’s intent in imposing judicial review and allows the 
government and merging parties the opportunity to skirt 
meaningful judicial review. As such, this Note concludes that 
courts should reanimate their role in reviewing consent decrees 
under the Tunney Act by affording a lower degree of deference to 
the Department of Justice. It is the correct reading of both the 
statute and the legislative history, it does not pose an 
unconstitutional imbalance between the judicial and executive 
branches, and it is critical to containing the harmful effects of 
anticompetitive mergers. 
 
 *  J.D. Candidate, May 2021, Washington and Lee University School of 
Law. Thank you to Professor Russell Miller for his advice and mentorship, and 
to the editors of the Washington and Lee Law Review for making this Note 
possible. Finally, thank you to my family, whose love and encouragement 
inspire me to make my goals a reality. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In July 2019, the Department of Justice (DOJ) approved a 
megamerger between two of the largest wireless carriers in the 
United States: Sprint and T-Mobile.1 The merging companies 
received the DOJ’s blessing by negotiating a consent decree,2 
containing terms with which Sprint and T-Mobile must comply 
to proceed as a merged entity.3 Many, however, questioned the 
DOJ’s wisdom in allowing further consolidation of the 
telecommunications market by negotiating this consent decree.4 
In fact, only five states signed on to the DOJ’s settlement 
agreement with the companies.5 Eighteen other states instead 
pursued litigation to enjoin the transaction.6 Fourteen states 
 
 1. See Justice Department Settles with T-Mobile and Sprint in Their 
Proposed Merger by Requiring a Package of Divestitures to Dish, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUST. (July 26, 2019), https://perma.cc/C5XV-RUPL (last updated July 30, 
2019) [hereinafter DOJ Press Release] (announcing the terms under which the 
DOJ and the companies agreed to settle in order to receive the government’s 
approval of the deal). 
 2. Consent decrees are negotiated settlements between the enforcing 
agency and defendant(s), in which the defendant agrees to specific restraints 
on its future behavior in exchange for the government’s agreement to 
terminate the case. C. PAUL ROGERS III ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW: POLICY AND 
PRACTICE 42 (4th ed. 2008). 
 3. See id. (stating that the consent decree requires that Sprint and 
T-Mobile divest Sprint’s prepaid business to Dish Network and make certain 
accommodations to Dish so that it can emerge as a viable competitor to the 
combined firm); see also infra Part II (describing the DOJ’s use of consent 
decrees for antitrust enforcement). 
 4. See, e.g., The Editorial Board, If You Own a Cellphone, You Should 
Worry About the T-Mobile-Sprint Deal, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2019), https://
perma.cc/P5EH-TRMQ (“[The DOJ’s] contortions to approve the merger 
demonstrate once again that the federal government has lost interest in 
preventing corporate consolidation. Even the most obviously anti-competitive 
deals, like this union of two companies that have long been bitter rivals, are 
able to obtain the government’s consent.”). 
 5. See DOJ Press Release, supra note 1 (listing the participation of five 
state Attorneys General: Nebraska, Kansas, Ohio, Oklahoma, and South 
Dakota). 
 6. See Lauren Hirsch, Texas and Nevada Are the Latest States to Defect 
from the Lawsuit Against Sprint/T-Mobile Deal, CNBC (Nov. 25, 2019, 4:47 
PM), https://perma.cc/SK2W-B9P5 (detailing the number of states that 
continued to pursue injunction of the merger in court, though four states have 
recently dropped their suits). 
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ultimately pursued an action against the parties in federal 
district court, alleging that the merger would substantially 
lessen competition in the relevant market.7 
Criticisms of the DOJ’s approval of the proposed merger 
centered around then-Assistant Attorney General Makan 
Delrahim, who managed the DOJ’s antitrust arm.8 Attention 
focused on Mr. Delrahim was appropriate given the DOJ’s 
structure: the DOJ’s antitrust head makes all final decisions 
within the division regarding whether to prosecute or settle 
major antitrust transactions.9 The nature of this consolidated 
decision-making power, accompanied by the fact that Mr. 
Delrahim’s position and the position’s direct superior—the 
United States Attorney General—are appointed directly by the 
President, means that antitrust decision-making at the DOJ 
carries risk of political influence.10 In the T-Mobile-Sprint deal, 
commentators accused Mr. Delrahim of succumbing to such 
influence: he worked to defend corporate interests over that of 
the public in shepherding the merger through the DOJ approval 
process.11 
This is the point at which Congress envisioned the judiciary 
to intervene by enacting the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties 
 
 7. See New York v. Deutsche Telekom AG, 439 F. Supp. 3d 179, 186 
(S.D.N.Y. 2020) (listing the state plaintiffs in the action). Following a bench 
trial, the court denied the states’ request to enjoin the merger. See id. at 189 
(denying the injunction request because it disagreed with the states’ case on 
predicted anticompetitive effects and the state of the market going forward). 
 8. See Katie Benner & Cecilia Kang, How a Top Antitrust Official 
Helped T-Mobile and Sprint Merge, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2019), https://
perma.cc/5EAJ-5NF7 (last updated Feb. 11, 2020) (“As the $26 billion 
blockbuster merger between T-Mobile and Sprint teetered, . . . Makan 
Delrahim . . . labored to rescue it behind the scenes . . . .”). 
 9. See infra Part IV.A. 
 10. See Cass R. Sunstein, Imagine That Donald Trump Has Almost No 
Control Over Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2020), https://perma.cc/8PVB-
KGNT (proposing that Congress transform the DOJ “into an independent 
agency, legally immunized from the president’s day-to-day control”). 
 11. See The Editorial Board, Why Is the Justice Department Treating 
T-Mobile Like a Client?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2019), https://perma.cc/HNC3-
S9L4 (“Rather than defending the public interest, [Delrahim] was working to 
defend T-Mobile’s interests.”). 
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Act (the Tunney Act).12 The Tunney Act requires that the 
DOJ— after having negotiated a consent decree with merging 
parties to settle the government’s antitrust concerns—seek 
enforcement of the decree in a United States district court.13 
When deciding whether to enter a proposed consent decree into 
force under the Tunney Act, the court must determine whether 
the decree is “in the public interest.”14 
Congress enacted the Tunney Act to charge the judiciary 
with conducting an “independent”15 review of the DOJ’s decision 
to settle a merger inquiry, and, in so doing, ensure that the court 
does not dilute its review to mere “rubber stamping.”16 Courts, 
however, interpret their Tunney Act duty as one that requires a 
high degree of deference to the DOJ’s “prosecutorial 
discretion.”17 Courts also interpret the Tunney Act review as one 
 
 12. See Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) 
(“Before entering any consent judgment proposed by the United States under 
this section, the court shall determine that the entry of such judgment is in 
the public interest.”); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1451 
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (referring to the statute as the “Tunney Act”). 
 13. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (stating that any proposed consent decree by the 
United States must be filed with the district court for review). 
 14. See id. § 16(e)(1) (providing that judicial approval is conditioned on 
the court’s determination that entry of the decree is in the public interest). The 
Tunney Act applies to negotiated consent decrees that arise out of any alleged 
violations of the federal antitrust laws, not just those arising from 
anticompetitive mergers. See id. § 16(b) (mandating that “[a]ny proposal for a 
consent judgment submitted by the United States for entry in any civil 
proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United States under the antitrust 
laws” is subject to the procedural requirements promulgated by the Tunney 
Act). Because most of the important caselaw developed under the Tunney Act 
has been specific to consent decrees regarding mergers, that will be the focus 
of this Note. 
 15. The Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act: Hearings on S. 782 and 
S. 1088 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust & Monopoly of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 93d Cong. 452 (1973) [hereinafter 1973 Tunney Act Hearings] 
(remarks by Sen. John V. Tunney and Sen. Edward Gurney). 
 16. See id. at 196 (“[W]e want the courts to do more than they have done 
in the past. We want them to do more than just simply rubberstamp a 
decree.”). 
 17. See Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1459–60 (“The court’s authority to review 
the decree depends entirely on the government’s exercising its prosecutorial 
discretion by bringing a case in the first place.”); see also United States v. SBC 
Commc’ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d 1, 39 (D.D.C. 2007) (stating that the Microsoft court 
“based its decision on constitutional concerns that overriding prosecutorial 
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that is narrow in scope—limited to the claims contained in the 
DOJ’s complaint.18 As a result, the DOJ often negotiates the 
consent decree prior to writing the complaint.19 This allows it to 
game the review process: negotiate the settlement first and then 
craft a complaint tailored to the specific concerns addressed in 
the consent decree, ensuring a court’s easy approval.20 In so 
doing, the DOJ retrofits the complaint and skirts meaningful 
judicial review.21 
The DOJ employed this strategy in its settlement in the 
T-Mobile-Sprint deal.22 The DOJ filed an antitrust complaint 
against the merging parties to enjoin the transaction and 
simultaneously submitted a motion for court approval of the 
DOJ’s proposed consent decree to settle the action and allow the 
merger to proceed.23 By taking advantage of the court-created 
rule that judicial review is limited only to the claims that the 
DOJ resolved in the proposed consent decree, the government 
deprives the reviewing court of the opportunity to scrutinize the 
settlement in light of the public interest.24 
The merger, which is now complete,25 illustrates the 
problem with the judiciary’s restrained interpretation of its role 
 
discretion to initiate antitrust suits infringes on the proper separation of 
powers”). The DOJ is the federal government’s prosecuting body. See ROGERS 
ET AL., supra note 2, at 36–37 (explaining the federal antitrust law enforcement 
framework). Thus, courts speak of agency deference in this context as 
“prosecutorial discretion.” See Stephanos Bibas, The Need for Prosecutorial 
Discretion, 19 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 369, 372 (2010) (explaining that 
prosecutorial discretion is “a kind of Chevron inquiry”). 
 18. See infra notes 123–125 and accompanying text. 
 19. See infra notes 124–125 and accompanying text. 
 20. See infra notes 126–128 and accompanying text. 
 21. See infra notes 126–128 and accompanying text. 
 22. See DOJ Press Release, supra note 1 (stating that the DOJ filed both 
the complaint and the proposed consent decree with the court on July 26, 
2019). 
 23. See id. (noting that the DOJ sought to block the proposed transaction 
and, “[a]t the same time,” filed a proposed settlement to resolve the 
government’s concerns). 
 24. See infra notes 126–128 and accompanying text. 
 25. See T-Mobile Completes Merger with Sprint to Create the New 
T-Mobile, T-MOBILE USA (Apr. 1, 2020), https://perma.cc/5MGT-9UL6 
(“[T-Mobile] announced today that it has officially completed its merger with 
Sprint Corporation to create the New T-Mobile, a supercharged Un-carrier 
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under the Tunney Act:26 it allows the DOJ to retrofit complaints 
to match the consent decree and circumvent meaningful “public 
interest” review.27 Thus, the court’s continual abdication of its 
statutory duty to substantively engage in Tunney Act review 
deprives the public of assurance that only those settlements that 
are in the public interest are enforced.28 
This Note, therefore, focuses on determining the 
appropriate level of agency deference that the judiciary should 
afford the DOJ when administering the Tunney Act’s public 
interest review. Following this introduction, Part I of this Note 
describes the importance of the consent decree in government 
enforcement of the federal antitrust laws and the Tunney Act’s 
role in that process. Part II identifies the judiciary’s early 
interpretations of the Tunney Act’s public interest standard, 
which produced caselaw prescribing a high level of deference to 
the DOJ during the review. Part III examines Congress’s 
attempt to rectify this deferential review through its 2004 
amendments to the Tunney Act. Part III details important 
legislative history that reveals the legislature’s effort to double 
down on mandating exacting judicial review. Part III then 
proceeds by summarizing the negligible effect of the 2004 
amendments on Tunney Act jurisprudence—where the caselaw 
stands today. 
Part IV argues that courts have erroneously afforded too 
much deference to the DOJ in applying Tunney Act review. Part 
V supports the argument using these three sources: Congress, 
the U.S. Constitution, and antitrust policy. Part V offers the 
recent United States v. CVS Health29 as evidence of a potential 
shift among the courts with regard to their role under the 
Tunney Act. This Note proposes that CVS Health sets forth a 
jurisprudential framework that future reviewing courts should 
 
that will deliver a transformative 5G network.”). The district court approved 
the consent decree on April 14, 2020. See United States v. Deutsche Telekom 
AG, No. 19-2232, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65096, at *24–25 (D.D.C. Apr. 14, 
2020) (concluding that the consent decree was in the public interest). 
 26. See infra notes 123–125 and accompanying text. 
 27. See infra notes 126–128 and accompanying text. 
 28. See infra Part IV. 
 29. 407 F. Supp. 3d 45 (D.D.C. 2019). 
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adopt.30 Finally, this Note concludes by proposing that courts 
reevaluate their role under the Tunney Act and apply an 
exacting review of the DOJ’s proposed consent decrees. A 
scrutinizing Tunney Act review provides a meaningful check on 
the DOJ to ensure that the agency—acting under the country’s 
executive authority31—is serving the public interest by 
“faithfully execut[ing]”32 the federal antitrust laws.33 
I.  THE CONSENT DECREE AND THE TUNNEY ACT 
The consent decree plays a critical role in the government’s 
effective enforcement of federal antitrust laws.34 The Tunney 
Act administers the procedures under which the DOJ must 
comply when seeking entry of these consent decrees.35 Thus, in 
proposing changes to the interpretation of the Tunney Act’s role 
in the consent decree process, this Note first assesses the power 
of the consent decree, the risks inherent to “cheap decrees,”36 
and the role of the judiciary in ensuring that only decrees 
advancing the public interest are entered into force. 
A.  Federal Antitrust Enforcement: The DOJ and FTC’s 
Concurrent Jurisdiction 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and DOJ both 
enforce the federal antitrust laws, and each do so in part 
through the use of the consent decree.37 Consent decrees are a 
frequently used, important method of enforcing the federal 
antitrust laws for both agencies.38 However, their enforcement, 
 
 30. See infra Part V. 
 31. See infra notes 210–220 and accompanying text. 
 32. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 5. 
 33. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 34. See infra Part I.A.2. 
 35. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (listing the procedural requirements). 
 36. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 37. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 38. See infra note 60 and accompanying text. 
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jurisdiction, and the procedure under which each agency must 
adhere when enforcing a consent decree are distinct.39 
The FTC and DOJ share government enforcement 
responsibilities of federal antitrust laws.40 Private plaintiffs also 
have standing to bring federal antitrust suits,41 and state 
governments may sue under federal antitrust laws either 
alleging injury to the government or through parens patriae 
litigation.42 
The federal antitrust enforcement scheme features 
overlapping—but not identical—authority by the FTC and 
DOJ.43 Both the FTC and DOJ have jurisdiction to enforce the 
Clayton Act44—a civil statute that, among other things, 
prohibits anticompetitive mergers.45 The DOJ has exclusive 
federal jurisdiction over the Sherman Act,46 which contains both 
civil and criminal enforcement provisions, and the FTC has 
 
 39. See infra Part IV.A.2 (explaining that the Tunney Act dictates consent 
decree procedures for the DOJ only). 
 40. See ROGERS ET AL., supra note 2, at 36–37 (stating that the DOJ and 
FTC share the federal responsibility for antitrust enforcement). 
 41. See Clayton Act of 1914 § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (providing that any 
private party “injured in business or property by reason of anything forbidden 
in the antitrust laws may sue”). 
 42. See ROGERS ET AL., supra note 2, at 36 (explaining that state 
governments have the option of either suing to enforce their own state 
antitrust laws or bringing federal antitrust lawsuits on behalf of state 
residents). 
 43. See id. (distinguishing FTC and DOJ jurisdiction). 
 44. Clayton Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27. 
 45. See ROGERS ET AL., supra note 2, at 36 (“Responsibility for Clayton 
Act . . . enforcement is shared by the [DOJ] and the Federal Trade 
Commission.”); Clayton Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. § 18 
No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting 
commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part 
of the stock or other share capital and no person subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the 
whole or any part of the assets of another person engaged also in 
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where in any line 
of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of 
the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to 
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly. 
 46. See 15 U.S.C. § 4 (stating the Attorney General’s authority to 
“institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain” violations under the 
Sherman Act). 
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exclusive jurisdiction to enforce the Federal Trade Commission 
Act,47 a purely civil statute.48 Congress enacted the Federal 
Trade Commission Act to mirror the civil jurisdiction that the 
DOJ already retained through the Sherman and Clayton Acts 
“as well as to cover any loopholes in those statutes.”49 The 
statutory scheme only grants the FTC with the authority to 
enforce statutes that provide civil remedies; the FTC does not 
have authority to prosecute criminal antitrust violations.50 
Thus, the FTC and DOJ both play an important role in 
enforcing the federal antitrust laws and both employ consent 
decrees as part of their strategy of effective enforcement.51 Their 
diverging authority to administer the provisions of the statutes, 
principally the DOJ’s civil and criminal jurisdiction versus the 
FTC’s purely civil jurisdiction, is critical to Tunney Act 
jurisprudence.52 Also telling, as explained in more detail in Part 
IV.A.2, infra, is that the Tunney Act only dictates the process by 
which the DOJ enforces its consent decrees, not the FTC. 
B.  The Role of the Consent Decree 
The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act53 provides the FTC and DOJ 
with a thirty-day window to review large corporate mergers 
before the transaction’s closing.54 During this period, either the 
 
 47. Id. §§ 41–58. 
 48. See id. § 45(a) (“The Commission is hereby empowered and directed 
to prevent [parties] from using unfair methods of competition in or affecting 
commerce . . . .”); see also ROGERS ET AL., supra note 2, at 36 (explaining the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission Act). 
 49. See ROGERS ET AL., supra note 2, at 36–37 (explaining the role of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act in federal antitrust enforcement). But see FTC 
v. R.F. Keppel & Bros., Inc., 291 U.S. 304, 310–12 (1934) (characterizing the 
FTC’s ability to pursue antitrust violations that “fall short of a Sherman Act 
violation”). 
 50. See ROGERS ET AL., supra note 2, at 43 (“The FTC has no Sherman Act 
and no criminal jurisdiction . . . .”). 
 51. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 52. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 53. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 
U.S.C. § 18a. 
 54. See id. § 18a(b) (prescribing the procedure for the mandatory “waiting 
period”). 
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DOJ or the FTC55 determines whether the merger implicates 
antitrust concerns and then, based on that determination, either 
allows the transaction to consummate or decides that the 
merger warrants further investigation.56 If the merger proceeds 
to the investigation phase—and the DOJ or FTC begin 
identifying anticompetitive issues with the merger—the 
merging parties and the agency often discuss opportunities for 
settlement.57 A settlement culminates in a negotiated consent 
decree, where the merging parties agree to divest certain assets 
to a competitor or agree to certain behavior in order to alleviate 
the government’s concerns.58 
 
 55. See id. § 18a(b)(1)(A) (stating that the thirty-day window begins “on 
the date of the receipt by the Federal Trade Commission and the Assistant 
Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division of the Department of 
Justice”). Importantly, though the FTC and DOJ both receive the premerger 
notification and the materials that accompany it, only one of the agencies will 
review it. See Premerger Notification and the Merger Review Process, FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, https://perma.cc/BR38-4PKJ [hereinafter Merger Review 
Process] (“Parties proposing a deal file with both the FTC and DOJ, but only 
one antitrust agency will review the proposed merger.”). The FTC and DOJ 
engage in a “clearance process” for each merger, during which the two agencies 
consult to decide which should be “cleared” to review the merger. See id. 
(explaining the clearance process). 
 56. See 15 U.S.C. § 18(e)(1)–(2) (explaining that the agencies may request 
additional information from the parties and extend the waiting period for the 
time it takes the parties to comply with the request, and an additional thirty 
days after they complied for the agencies to review the information). The 
agencies call this request for additional information a “second request.” See 
FED. TRADE COMM’N PREMERGER NOTIFICATION OFF., WHAT IS THE PREMERGER 
NOTIFICATION PROGRAM? 1 (2009), https://perma.cc/RZT7-NARK (PDF) 
(describing the procedural timeline of a “second request”). 
 57. See Merger Review Process, supra note 55 (stating that the length of 
the investigative phase can “be extended by agreement between the parties 
and the government in an effort to resolve any remaining issues without 
litigation”). 
 58. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. ANTITRUST DIV., ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY 
GUIDE TO MERGER REMEDIES 7 (2004), https://perma.cc/3BVD-6A8H (PDF) 
[hereinafter DOJ MERGER REMEDIES] (explaining that consent decrees take 
two forms: “one address[ing] the structure of the market, the other the conduct 
of the merged firm”); Merger Review Process, supra note 55 (“In this situation 
the parties may resolve the concerns about the merger by agreeing to sell off 
the particular overlapping business unit or assets of one of the merging 
parties, but then complete the remainder of the merger as proposed.”); James 
Rob Savin, Tunney Act ‘96: Two Decades of Judicial Misapplication, 46 EMORY 
L.J. 363, 365 (1997) (“Under the purview of a consent decree, the defendant 
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Consent decrees are common and sometimes the “only 
realistic” method of achieving effective antitrust enforcement.59 
At least 80 percent of government antitrust cases are settled 
rather than tried, and such settlements generally occur by way 
of a consent decree.60 The enforcing agency and defendants each 
are motivated to settle by consent decree.61 The government’s 
motivations to settle stem from efficacy concerns, cost savings, 
and a “desire to achieve a maximum utilization of the limited 
staff that is available for antitrust prosecutions.”62 
The merging parties want to settle in lieu of defending the 
transaction in litigation for three primary reasons: (1) to employ 
the prima facie evidence exemption in any subsequent litigation 
under the Clayton Act,63 (2) to avoid the “heavy burdens” that 
accompany the uncertainty of a pending merger litigation—
which include massive legal fees, distraction of executives, and 
business operation limbo,64 and (3) to enjoy the favorable 
publicity that accompanies a consummated merger (as opposed 
 
accepts specific limitations on his future conduct, and the government 
indicates its willingness to terminate the suit on those terms.”). 
 59. See Savin, supra note 58, at 365–66 (“Given the limited resources of 
the [DOJ’s] Antitrust Division, the only realistic means the government has to 
provide effective antitrust enforcement is the consent decree.”); ROGERS ET AL., 
supra note 2, at 42 (explaining that both the FTC and DOJ employ the consent 
decree tool). 
 60. See ROGERS ET AL., supra note 2, at 42 (“Most government antitrust 
cases (eighty percent or more) never are tried but rather are settled, generally 
by a device known as a consent decree.”). 
 61. See Savin, supra note 58, at 365–66 (summarizing the motivations to 
settle specific to the government and the merging parties). 
 62. See Consent Decree Program of the Dep’t of Justice: Hearings Before 
the Antitrust Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong. 2–3 
(1957) [hereinafter 1957 Consent Decree Hearings] (statement of Rep. 
Emanuel Celler, Chairman, Antitrust Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary) (explaining the various motivations for defendants to settle an 
antitrust litigation). 
 63. See Savin, supra note 58, at 366 (explaining the exemption contained 
in the Clayton Act that prevents a pre-trial consent decree from being used as 
prima facie evidence against the defendant in subsequent litigations); see also 
supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 64. See Savin, supra note 58, at 366 (stating that the various costs of 
litigation “are likely to lead defendants to seek a consent settlement if the 
challenged practice is not vital to their business or if they feel their case is not 
a sure winner”). 
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to the negative publicity of a protracted antitrust battle). 
Consent decrees are also attractive to the merging parties 
because they do not constitute an admission of guilt and are not 
an adjudication on the merits of the alleged violations.65 
C.  The Danger of “Cheap Decrees” 
“Cheap decrees” are decrees that are “questionable because 
they have been negotiated for reasons other than remedying” 
the alleged antitrust violations or because they contain “terms 
that do not substantially advance the public interest.”66 
Inappropriate motivations for settling an antitrust concern by 
consent decree include “reluctance or fear to try the case,” 
“concern about the costs of trial,” or worry that further 
investigation or discovery may reveal a weaker case for the 
 
 65. See id. at 365 (“[T]ypically, [the decree] states that the defendant 
denies the substantive allegations of the complaint and that the decree is 
entered ‘without trial or adjudication . . . .’”). This is especially important with 
regard to subsequent private enforcement of antitrust laws under the Clayton 
Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (discussing judgments obtained through antitrust 
enforcement); see also supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text. A litigated 
judgment or decree against a defendant may be used as prima facie evidence 
against that defendant in future litigation, unless the case was settled by 
consent decree prior to any trial occurring. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (stating that 
the prima facie evidence provision “does not apply to consent judgments or 
decrees entered before any testimony has been taken”). If a case settles by 
consent decree prior to trial, therefore, the parties can proceed with any 
subsequent litigation without fear that the government may use previous 
litigation against them. This can serve as a major motivating factor for 
defendants to settle an antitrust litigation prior to trial. See Savin, supra note 
58, at 366 (stating that “[t]he largest inducement for the defendant to settle” 
is the prima facie evidence exemption for pre-trial consent decrees). 
 66. See J. THOMAS ROSCH, COMM’R, FED. TRADE COMM’N, REMARKS BEFORE 
THE 18TH ST. GALLEN INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW FORUM: CONSENT 
DECREES: IS THE PUBLIC GETTING ITS MONEY’S WORTH? 9–10 (Apr. 7, 2011), 
https://perma.cc/57QJ-6S33 (PDF) (explaining the adverse effects of 
improperly negotiated decrees). This Note does not assume that these cheap 
decrees are the norm, nor even that they occur with a certain frequency. See, 
e.g., DOJ MERGER REMEDIES, supra note 58, at 4 (establishing that, as part of 
DOJ guidance for staff negotiating consent decrees, “restoring competition is 
the only appropriate goal with respect to crafting merger remedies”). This 
Note, however, does argue that some consent decrees fail to serve the public 
interest and Congress sought to solve that failure by imposing a 
non-deferential Tunney Act review. See infra Part IV.A. 
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government than anticipated.67 These reasons—though “wholly 
legitimate” as rationales to settle in the context of litigation 
between two private parties—do not meet the public interest 
mandate imposed upon the federal antitrust enforcement 
agencies.68 
Cheap decrees fail to serve the public interest in two key 
ways.69 First, the government, perhaps motivated by fear of 
what may occur by pursuing a full adjudicative proceeding on 
the merits, may agree to a cheap decree that does not properly 
remedy the alleged antitrust violation by under-settling.70 In 
other words, the agency might not aggressively pursue all 
appropriate remedies because—in an effort to settle—it agreed 
to more lenient terms than what it could have otherwise been 
able to achieve in court.71 Or, the terms are insufficient to 
address the antitrust violations that would have been fully 
assessed following discovery and a hearing.72 Decrees that 
underdeliver fail to meet the public interest standard because it 
 
 67. See ROSCH, supra note 66, at 10 (summarizing the reasons for which 
the government may choose to settle a case). 
 68. See id. (stating that “decree[s] that reflect[] the private and personal 
considerations of those involves in the litigation” should not be entered into 
force). Despite the distinct processes through which decrees are pursued and 
entered into force at the DOJ and FTC both are subject to a public interest 
standard. Compare Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 16(e)(1) (requiring that a consent decree proposed by the DOJ meet a public 
interest standard prior to its entry into force), with Johnson Prods. Co. v. FTC, 
549 F.2d 35, 38 (7th Cir. 1977) (explaining that the FTC, “unlike a private 
litigant, must act in furtherance of the public interest” in determining whether 
to enter a consent decree). 
 69. See ROSCH, supra note 66, at 9–12 (explaining that an improper 
consent decree may underdeliver or overdeliver on the remedy’s scope). 
 70. See 1957 Consent Decree Hearings, supra note 62, at 3 (“[A] consent 
settlement by its very nature involves the process of compromise in the 
negotiations by attorneys for each side.”). 
 71. See 1973 Tunney Act Hearings, supra note 15, at 128 (statement of 
Harold E. Kohn) (“Even the best intentioned and most competent attorneys 
employed by the Justice Department may occasionally overlook the full 
implications of their own acts or be inclined to make a settlement that is less 
than desirable from the public point of view in order to avoid being 
overburdened.”). 
 72. See ROSCH, supra note 66, at 10 (asserting that the agencies should 
be assured, prior to seeking to enforce a decree, that the “decree appropriately 
remedies the violations”). 
LEAVING JUDICIAL REVIEW WITH THE JUDICIARY 939 
 
does not satisfy the agency’s statutory mandate of prosecuting 
and remedying violations of the federal antitrust laws.73 
Alternatively, the DOJ may negotiate a cheap decree that 
exceeds what it “would have been able to obtain, had it been 
forced to litigate the merger case.”74 For example, the relief that 
the DOJ may procure through the consent decree may be much 
broader than relief that a court would have crafted in its 
judgment.75 This occurs when merging parties feel a sense of 
urgency to clear the agency’s review process and, as a result, 
agree to relatively small divestitures to alleviate the 
government’s concerns.76 The sense of urgency may arise from 
pressure to raise stock prices through news of a successful 
merger as opposed to a dragging, costly litigation.77 
A notable example of over-settling is mergers involving 
innovation markets,78 an area where antitrust enforcement 
 
 73. See 1957 Consent Decree Hearings, supra note 62, at 3 (“[A] question 
frequently arises as to whether . . . the consent decree has resulted in a 
compromise of the public interest.”). 
 74. See ROSCH, supra note 66, at 10–11 (explaining the overdelivering 
that occurs in some cheap decrees); see also Savin, supra note 58, at 366 ( “The 
government occasionally can secure relief through a consent decree which it 
could not win at trial.”). 
 75. See Savin, supra note 58, at 366 n.16 (stating that the consent decree 
“has been widely criticized as a device that transforms the Justice Department 
from an adjudicative branch of government into a regulatory agency, because 
the relief it can obtain is so broad” (citation omitted)). 
 76. See ROSCH, supra note 66, at 10–11 (explaining the pressure that 
merging parties face to consent to divesting assets in order for the merger to 
clear the agency’s review process); Robert B. Bell, Regulation by Consent 
Decree, 26 ANTITRUST 73, 73 (2011) (“Because litigating a merger case entails 
risk and litigation can delay closing by a year or more even if the private 
parties prevail, parties have been much more inclined to accept 
government-demanded settlement terms.”). 
 77. See Savin, supra note 58, at 366 (asserting that “unfavorable 
publicity” is among the many burdens that defendants bear when they engage 
in an antitrust litigation). 
 78. See Richard T. Rapp, The Misapplication of the Innovation Market 
Approach to Merger Analysis, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 19, 19–20 (1995) (explaining 
the difficulty in assessing antitrust violations in innovation markets). 
Innovation markets are those that involve “the research and development 
directed to particular new or improved goods or processes.” Id. at 23. The DOJ 
and FTC face difficulty enforcing the antitrust laws in innovation markets 
because they do not conform to traditional antitrust analysis. Id. at 46 
(proposing a new theory for antitrust enforcement in innovation markets); see 
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agencies have faced difficulty seeking remedies when litigating 
in courts, but are often able to negotiate consent decrees with 
the merging parties.79 The agency would not likely receive relief 
through litigation, but it is instead able to secure a win by 
settling prior to proceeding to litigation.80 Like a consent decree 
that underdelivers, a consent decree that contains remedies that 
are broader than what the agency would otherwise have been 
able to achieve through litigation also fails to serve the public 
interest:81 remedies that are not tailored to address antitrust 
concerns do not benefit the public interest.82 
D.  Judicial Review Under the Tunney Act 
Before the Tunney Act, the DOJ’s legal authority to dispose 
of litigation by consent decree was an implied power—not 
contained in the antitrust laws—”derived from the historical 
right of the prosecutor to initiate and conclude legal 
proceedings.”83 At the time, this implied power was restrained 
by the Supreme Court’s United States v. Swift & Co.,84 which 
 
Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C. L. REV. 551, 583 
(2012) (summarizing the difficulties that accompany an antitrust analysis of 
innovation markets). 
 79. See ROSCH, supra note 66, at 10–11 (stating that the FTC “has only 
infrequently brought merger cases based on an innovation market theory, and 
has never won such a case”). 
 80. See id. (describing the FTC’s lack of success in challenging innovation 
market mergers). 
 81. See Savin, supra note 58, at 366 n.16 (“[T]he decree has been widely 
criticized as a device that transforms the Justice Department from an 
adjudicative branch of government into a regulatory agency, because the relief 
it can obtain is so broad.”). 
 82. See DOJ MERGER REMEDIES, supra note 58, at 1 (explaining that the 
DOJ strives to ensure that “remedies are based on sound legal and economic 
principles and are closely related to the identified competitive harm”). 
 83. See Charles F. Phillips, Jr., The Consent Decree in Antitrust 
Enforcement, 18 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 39, 42–43 (1961) (summarizing the legal 
authority upon which the DOJ could enter consent decrees as settlements for 
antitrust allegations). 
 84. 286 U.S. 106 (1932). 
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imposed a stringent standard that the consent decree must meet 
for a court to reject or modify it.85 
The Tunney Act codified judicial review and, in so doing, 
imposed several procedural requirements that the DOJ must 
satisfy when seeking entry of a consent decree:86 the DOJ must 
publish its proposed consent decree—along with a “competitive 
impact statement” that must detail, among other things, the 
nature of the consent decree87—in the Federal Register for at 
least sixty days to allow for public comment.88 At the end of the 
sixty-day notice and comment period, the DOJ must respond to 
all written comments and publish those responses in the Federal 
Register.89 The DOJ must also publish the proposed consent 
decree and the competitive impact statement in a newspaper for 
at least seven days.90 This process is akin to the procedural 
requirements for agency rulemakings set forth under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).91 
The Tunney Act standardizes the process by which the DOJ 
seeks enforcement of its consent decrees.92 Acknowledging the 
value of the consent decree to federal antitrust enforcement, the 
Tunney Act safeguards against decrees that undermine the 
efficacy of settlements and cut against the federal antitrust laws 
as a whole.93 In interpreting the Tunney Act, however, courts 
 
 85. See id. at 119 (“Nothing less than a clear showing of grievous wrong 
evoked by new and unforeseen conditions should lead us to change what was 
decreed after years of litigation with the consent of all concerned.”). 
 86. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (listing the procedural requirements with which 
the DOJ must adhere). 
 87. See id. § 16(b)(1)–(6) (stating the required components of the 
competitive impact statement). 
 88. See id. § 16(b) (providing that the DOJ must publish the proposed 
consent decree and the competitive impact statement in the Federal Register 
for sixty days). 
 89. See id. (setting forth the DOJ’s response requirements). 
 90. See id. § 16(c) (listing the requirements for publication in 
newspapers). 
 91. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (requiring that agencies publish the proposed 
rulemaking in the Federal Register, receive comments from the public, and 
publish responses to those comments). 
 92. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)(1)–(6) (stating the required components of the 
competitive impact statement). 
 93. See ROGERS ET AL., supra note 2, at 42 (“Because major antitrust policy 
can be implemented through consent decrees, Congress enacted the [Tunney 
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have taken steps to artificially narrow the scope of their public 
interest review under the Act.94 
II.  JUDICIAL NARROWING OF THE “PUBLIC INTEREST” SCOPE 
OF REVIEW 
The Tunney Act provides that, when deciding whether to 
enter the DOJ’s proposed consent decree, “the court shall 
determine that the entry of such judgment is in the public 
interest.”95 Thus, the plain language of the Tunney Act does not 
require, or even contemplate, deference to the DOJ in 
mandating the judicial “public interest” review.96 Despite this, 
courts consistently place constraints on the scope and depth of 
their review.97 In creating the public interest standard, 
Congress intentionally declined to define “public interest” in the 
statute.98 As a result, “courts were left to formulate their own 
standards for evaluating decrees that fit their own definition of 
‘public interest.’”99 
 
Act] to exact greater judicial and public scrutiny of antitrust settlements in 
suits brought by the government.”). 
 94. See Savin, supra note 58, at 379 (explaining that courts have 
interpreted the Tunney Act in such a way that “may prevent future courts from 
conducting an effective Tunney Act review of proposed consent decrees”). 
 95. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (stating the “public interest” review 
requirements). 
 96. See id. (stating only that the court must make the determination); see 
also Lloyd C. Anderson, Mocking the Public Interest: Congress Restores 
Meaningful Judicial Review of Government Antitrust Consent Decrees, 31 VT. 
L. REV. 593, 593–94 (2007) (“The plain language of the Tunney Act appeared 
to require judges to make a de novo determination of whether a proposed 
antitrust consent decree was in the public interest, without giving deference 
to the executive branch’s view that the public interest would best be served by 
a proposed settlement.”). 
 97. See Anderson, supra note 96, at 593–94 (stating that courts declined 
to adopt a de novo standard and instead concluded that the review involve 
deference to the DOJ). 
 98. See Savin, supra note 58, at 372 (“Congress did not attempt to define 
‘public interest’ as it preferred the courts to adhere to precedent and derive a 
definition from the purpose of the antitrust laws.”). 
 99. Id. at 374; see Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001, 1003 (1983) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that the Tunney Act and its legislative 
history only provide “a paucity of guidance” in determining the public interest 
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Courts initially adopted a deferential approach.100 In so 
doing, they adopted a cursory balancing test, which weighed the 
benefits to the public against any harms that the consent decree 
might confer.101 Remarkably, some courts instead exhibited 
agency deference by employing a presumption for the DOJ that 
opponents of a settlement could then rebut.102 Courts rooted this 
presumption in the notion that a scrutinizing review of the 
DOJ’s prosecutorial discretion would implicate separation of 
powers concerns.103 This concern was born out of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States,104 
which cautioned against “assessing the wisdom of the [DOJ’s] 
judgment” in negotiating settlements.105 
Though the Supreme Court decided Sam Fox several years 
before the Tunney Act’s promulgation, lower courts applied the 
deference articulated within it to the Tunney Act’s judicial 
 
standard), aff’g United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 
1982). 
 100. See Savin, supra note 58, at 374–77 (summarizing the first judicial 
interpretations of the Act’s public interest standard); United States v. Gillette 
Co., 406 F. Supp. 713, 715 (D. Mass. 1975) (“It is not the court’s duty to 
determine whether this is the best possible settlement that could have been 
obtained if, say, the government had bargained a little harder. The court is not 
settling the case. . . . I must look at the overall picture not 
hypercritically . . . .”). 
 101. See Gillette, 406 F. Supp. at 715 (“Just as the parties are 
compromising, so in its process of weighing the public interest, must the 
court.”). 
 102. See United States v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 29, 
41 (W.D. Mo. 1975), aff’d, 534 F.2d 113 (8th Cir. 1976) (stating that the court 
“‘decline[d] appellants’ invitation to assess the wisdom of the Government’s 
judgment in negotiating and accepting the . . . consent decree, at least in the 
absence of any claim of bad faith or malfeasance on the part of the Government 
in so acting” (citing Sam Fox Publ’g Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 689 
(1961))). 
 103. See United States v. Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660, 666 (9th Cir. 1981) 
(“The balancing of competing social and political interests affected by a 
proposed antitrust consent decree must be left, in the first instance, to the 
discretion of the Attorney General.”); see infra Part IV.B. 
 104. 366 U.S. 683 (1961). 
 105. Id. at 689 (summarizing, as a unanimous Court, the need for a 
deferential review of actions made pursuant to the DOJ’s prosecutorial 
discretion); see Savin, supra note 58, at 376 (explaining that the Sam Fox dicta 
led courts to conclude that the Tunney Act did not bestow the courts with 
heightened review power). 
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approval process.106 Pursuant to Sam Fox, courts defer to the 
DOJ’s conclusion that the consent decree is in the public 
interest.107 That presumption is rebutted only by a finding of 
“bad faith or malfeasance” on the part of the DOJ in negotiating 
the decree.108 Thus, despite evidence in the legislative history 
indicating non-deferential review,109 courts’ initial 
interpretations for consent decree review under the Tunney Act 
relied upon legal reasoning that predated the Tunney Act.110 
In 1982, however, the D.C. District Court adopted a less 
deferential (or perhaps even nondeferential)111 analysis in 
United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. 
(AT&T).112 In AT&T, the trial court required that the 
company113 agree to specific modifications to the consent decree 
 
 106. See United States v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 534 F.2d 113, 
117 (8th Cir. 1976) (citing Sam Fox to affirm the lower court’s deferential 
standard of review under the Tunney Act). 
 107. See Sam Fox, 366 U.S. at 689 (stating that only a showing of “bad 
faith or malfeasance” would warrant a scrutinizing review of the DOJ’s 
“judgment in negotiating and accepting” a consent decree). 
 108. See Associated Milk Producers, 534 F.2d at 117 
It is axiomatic that the Attorney General must retain considerable 
discretion in controlling government litigation and in determining 
what is in the public interest. Thus, in our view, the intervention 
standard remains that which was stated in Sam Fox: “Bad faith or 
malfeasance on the part of the Government” in negotiating and 
accepting a consent decree must be shown before intervention will 
be allowed. 
 109. See infra Part IV.A. 
 110. See Associated Milk Producers, 534 F.2d at 117 (relying on Sam Fox’s 
pre-Tunney Act reasoning to interpret Tunney Act review). 
 111. See Savin, supra note 58, at 378 (“[AT&T] introduced the first 
nondeferential approach to reviewing proposed consent decrees.”). 
 112. 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d sub nom. Maryland v. United 
States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). 
 113. AT&T did not involve a corporate merger. See id. at 135–36. Instead, 
the conduct at issue was AT&T’s alleged monopolization of 
telecommunications services by its attempt to exclude competitors from the 
market. See id. The Tunney Act review and its underlying principles in the 
case are the same because the Tunney Act makes no distinction on the scope 
of review for mergers versus other antitrust litigation. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(b), 
(e) (providing that the Tunney Act and its public interest review apply to “any 
civil or criminal proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United States under 
the antitrust laws”). Thus, this factual distinction does not diminish the 
significance of AT&T for this Note. 
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prior to it granting approval.114 Notably, the court did so without 
finding that the DOJ acted in “bad faith or malfeasance,” as Sam 
Fox and its citing precedent prescribe.115 In reaching its 
conclusion, the court instead created a new standard for judicial 
review: “If the decree meets the requirements for an antitrust 
remedy—that is, if it effectively opens the relevant markets to 
competition and prevents the recurrence of anticompetitive 
activity, all without imposing undue and unnecessary burdens 
upon other aspects of the public interest—it will be approved.”116 
This heightened the standard for “public interest” review under 
the Tunney Act117 and placed the initial burden of proving that 
the consent decree was in the public interest on the DOJ.118 
The AT&T court justified its exacting review of the consent 
decree by citing the magnitude of the litigation (in terms of both 
the scale of the corporation and the “enormous undertaking” 
required to facilitate the terms of the consent decree).119 The 
Supreme Court declined to engage with the Tunney Act’s 
judicial review standard in this case by summarily affirming the 
district court’s decision without oral argument.120 The only 
written opinion in the decision was a dissent from Justice 
Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice White. 
 
 114. See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 214 (“[I]f the parties accept the Court’s 
modifications, the decree as modified will be approved as being in the public 
interest . . . .”). 
 115. See id. at 153 (stating that the court’s decision to impose modifications 
to the consent decree was based on an “attempt to harmonize competitive 
values with other legitimate public interest factors”). 
 116. Id. 
 117. See id. at 151 (“It does not follow from [Tunney Act precedent] that 
courts must unquestioningly accept a proffered decree as long as it somehow, 
and however inadequately, deals with the antitrust and other public policy 
problems implicated in the lawsuit.”). 
 118. See Savin, supra note 58, at 379 (“This test places the initial burden 
on the Justice Department to show that the proposed settlement allows for 
free competition and prevents the recurrence of anticompetitive activity.”). 
 119. See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 151–52 (stating that, because AT&T is the 
“largest corporation in the world” and the proposed decree would have 
“significant consequences,” the court “would be derelict in its duty if it adopted 
a narrow approach to its public interest review responsibilities”). 
 120. See Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001, 1006 (1983) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court issued a summary opinion 
without hearing arguments). 
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The dissent questioned the constitutionality of the Tunney Act’s 
judicial review of an executive function—the decision to 
prosecute or settle a case.121 AT&T is the Supreme Court’s only 
instance of Tunney Act jurisprudence to date. 
Perhaps due to the unordinary aspects of the protracted 
AT&T case,122 a series of D.C. Circuit cases subsequently 
tightened the public interest review, requiring a high degree of 
deference to the DOJ.123 In United States v. Microsoft Corp.,124 
the D.C. Circuit concluded that a court’s review of a proposed 
consent decree is limited to the allegations contained within the 
government’s initial complaint—due to the supposed 
constitutional mandate of deference to prosecutorial 
discretion—unless the allegations are so narrow that they 
constitute a “mockery of judicial power.”125 
The D.C. Circuit’s reading of the Tunney Act in Microsoft 
created a frictionless process for the DOJ in securing judicial 
 
 121. See id. at 1005–06 (“The question assigned to the district courts by 
the [Tunney] Act is a classic example of a question committed to the 
Executive.”). Justice Rehnquist did not acknowledge that this two-branch 
process (the executive branch’s decision to settle followed by the judicial 
branch’s decision to approve or deny that settlement) is the exact procedure 
prescribed in the criminal plea agreement setting, the constitutionality of 
which has not been denied by the Court. See infra Part IV.B. 
 122. See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 151 (stating that a “rubber stamp” was 
inappropriate because AT&T “is not an ordinary antitrust case”). 
 123. See Darren Bush, The Death of the Tunney Act at the Hands of an 
Activist D.C. Circuit, 63(I) ANTITRUST BULL. 113, 117 (2018) (“When district 
courts sought to reject consent decrees, the D.C. Circuit set them straight to 
conform with its notion that courts . . . must defer to the DOJ.”). 
 124. 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
 125. See id. at 1462 
[A] decree, even entered as a pretrial settlement, is a judicial act, 
and therefore the district judge is not obliged to accept one that, on 
its face and even after government explanation, appears to make a 
mockery of judicial power. Short of that eventuality, the Tunney Act 
cannot be interpreted as an authorization for a district judge to 
assume the role of Attorney General. 
Microsoft also involved a consent decree related to anticompetitive conduct 
rather than an anticompetitive merger. See id. at 1451 (stating that the DOJ 
brought the suit against Microsoft alleging that the corporation unlawfully 
maintained a monopoly of its operating systems). This, again, is insignificant 
to its precedential value in Tunney Act jurisprudence. See supra note 113 and 
accompanying text. 
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approval of consent decrees: “Since the [DOJ] routinely drafts 
the complaint after crafting the proposed order, this standard 
would very rarely result in rejection of a proposed order.”126 This 
process is efficient127 but contrary to the goals of the Tunney 
Act.128 
Two years later, in Massachusetts School of Law at 
Andover, Inc. v. United States,129 the D.C. Circuit built upon its 
holding in Microsoft to further limit its role.130 The court did so 
by transforming the deferential “mockery” concept into an entire 
standard of review.131 Citing Microsoft, the court stated that the 
reviewing court “should withhold approval [of a consent decree] 
only if any of the terms appear ambiguous, if the enforcement 
mechanism is inadequate, if third parties will be positively 
injured, or if the decree otherwise makes ‘a mockery of judicial 
power.’”132 This “mockery” standard limited Tunney Act judicial 
review even further, granting more power to the DOJ to 
successfully secure consent decrees.133 
 
 126. ROGERS ET AL., supra note 2, at 42 (explaining the Microsoft decision’s 
effect on the DOJ’s ability to seek entry of its consent decrees); Savin, supra 
note 58, at 380 (“If a court may consider only the relationship between the 
actual allegations and the remedies in the decree, the Department of Justice 
can secure judicial approval by submitting a complaint tailored to a 
prenegotiated settlement.”). 
 127. See Savin, supra note 58, at 365–66 (noting the efficiencies that 
accompany resolving antitrust concerns by consent decree). 
 128. See 1973 Tunney Act Hearings, supra note 15, at 452 (remarks by Sen. 
John V. Tunney and Sen. Edward Gurney) (explaining that Congress enacted 
the Tunney Act to eliminate judicial rubberstamping). 
 129. 118 F.3d 776 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 130. See id. at 783 (“In part because of the constitutional questions that 
would be raised if courts were to subject the government’s exercise of its 
prosecutorial discretion to non-deferential review . . . we have construed the 
public interest inquiry narrowly.” (citing Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1457–59)). 
 131. See id. (holding that the court must examine the decree based on 
certain factors “or if the decree otherwise makes ‘a mockery of judicial power’”); 
United States v. SBC Commc’ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d 1, 35–36 (explaining that 
Massachusetts School of Law’s “formulation of the ‘mockery’ concept 
apparently casts it as a standard of review, to be used unless there are other 
specific problems with the consent decree”). 
 132. Mass. Sch. of L. at Andover, Inc., 118 F.3d at 783. 
 133. See Bush, supra note 123, at 120 (stating that the “mockery” standard 
“expressly limits intervention in consent decrees to exceptionally rare 
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Thus, since the Tunney Act’s enactment, courts have taken 
steps to meaningfully restrict its public interest review.134 The 
judiciary has done this by interpreting the Tunney Act to 
require significant agency deference when engaging in public 
interest review and, relying on pre-Tunney Act dicta, 
understanding constitutional concerns to profoundly constrain 
the scope of the district court’s review.135 These developments 
prompted Congress to take action by amending the Tunney Act 
in 2004.136 
III.  CONGRESS’S RESPONSE: THE 2004 AMENDMENTS TO THE 
TUNNEY ACT 
Courts’ failures to engage in robust, nondeferential review 
signaled a return to the judicial rubber stamping that Congress 
sought to prevent.137 The D.C. Circuit’s deferential 
interpretation of the Tunney Act’s judicial review mandate,138 
operating at its peak with Massachusetts School of Law’s 
“mockery” standard, prompted Congress to reevaluate the 
Tunney Act in the early 2000’s and amend the legislation in 
2004.139 
 
circumstances” and “further places extreme deference into the hands of the 
DOJ”). 
 134. See Anderson, supra note 96, at 594–95 (stating that the D.C. 
Circuit’s jurisprudence on the Tunney Act reduced the court’s role to “merely 
ministerial in nature”). 
 135. See supra notes 104–133 and accompanying text. 
 136. See Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-237, 118 Stat. 661 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 16(e)(1)) (summarizing the amendments to the Tunney Act); Anderson, 
supra note 96, at 606 (explaining that Congress acted in response to the D.C. 
Circuit precedents that narrowed the Tunney Act review). 
 137. See Bush, supra note 123, at 135 (explaining that the federal court’s 
permissive, deferential application of the Tunney Act created a “return to 
[pre-Tunney Act] judicial rubber-stamping of consent decrees”). 
 138. See Anderson, supra note 96, at 594 (noting that the “decades-long 
consensus” regarding meaningful Tunney Act review “unraveled in the 1990s 
in a string of decisions by the United States Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia”). 
 139. See Bush, supra note 123, at 122 (“Displeased with the cases in the 
D.C. Circuit that suggested that the only route for the courts was to 
rubber-stamp final judgments proposed by the DOJ, Congress sought to 
establish more clearly the intended consequences of the Tunney Act.”). 
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A.  The Revised Tunney Act 
Congress addressed the concern that judicial review 
devolved into pre-Tunney Act rubber stamping140 by amending 
the Tunney Act in 2004.141 In so doing, Congress attempted to 
clarify the extent to which courts should scrutinize a negotiated 
consent decree when engaging in Tunney Act review.142 
Congress’s efforts produced two changes.143 First, Congress 
made express judicial findings to reinforce the Tunney Act’s 
purpose and scope.144 Congress achieved this by explicitly 
superseding the Massachusetts School of Law “mockery” 
standard.145 Second, Congress altered the language of the 
statute’s public interest review provision.146 To require a more 
exacting judicial review, Congress replaced the permissive 
“may” with “shall” in stating that “the court shall consider” 
 
 140. See 150 CONG. REC. S3615 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 2004) (remarks by Sen. 
Herbert Kohl) (introducing a bill to amend the Tunney Act because “many 
courts seem to have ignored [the] statute and do little more than ‘rubber 
stamp’ antitrust settlements”). 
 141. See Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-237, 118 Stat. 661 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 16(e)(1)) (providing the various textual changes to the public interest 
standard that a reviewing court will apply). 
 142. See Anderson, supra note 96, at 595 (“A bipartisan effort was 
launched in the U.S. Senate to overturn the D.C. Circuit’s ‘mockery’ standard 
and restore meaningful judicial oversight.”); Bush, supra note 123, at 122 
(explaining that Congress amended the Tunney Act to “compel[] courts to 
undertake a meaningful Tunney Act review”). 
 143. See Anderson, supra note 96, at 595–96 (summarizing the two 
provisions contained in the Tunney Act amendments). 
 144. See Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-237, 118 Stat. 668 
Congress finds that the (A) purpose of the Tunney Act was to ensure 
that the entry of antitrust consent judgments is in the public 
interest; and (B) it would misconstrue the meaning and 
Congressional intent in enacting the Tunney Act to limit the 
discretion of district courts to review antitrust consent judgments 
solely to determining whether entry of those consent judgment 
would make a “mockery of the judicial function.” 
 145. See infra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 146. See Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-237, 118 Stat. 668–69 (listing Congress’s modifications 
to the provision of the Tunney Act that instruct courts on the public interest 
review, 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)). 
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certain factors in conducting its public interest review.147 
Despite these concrete efforts on the part of Congress, courts 
interpreted the amendments as having little effect on existing 
precedent.148 
B.  Judicial Application of the Revised Tunney Act 
The D.C. District Court was the first to conclude that the 
amendments were inconsequential to Tunney Act 
jurisprudence.149 In United States v. SBC Communications,150 
the court determined that “a close reading of the law 
demonstrates that the 2004 amendments effected minimal 
changes,”151 and added that its standard of review “remains 
sharply proscribed by precedent.”152 The court did, however, 
hold that the amendments expressly overruled the 
Massachusetts School of Law broadened interpretation of the 
“mockery” concept, which construed it as an entire standard of 
review for Tunney Act courts to follow.153 The SBC 
Communications court ultimately decided that the amendments 
preserved Microsoft’s “mockery” concept as good law because 
that only applied to the narrowness of the complaint rather than 
to the scope of judicial review.154 
 
 147. See id. (stating the statutory changes to the Tunney Act public 
interest review language); see also Anderson, supra note 96, at 596 (stating 
that the amendments “make it mandatory—not merely discretionary—for 
courts to consider various factors in making the public interest 
determination”). 
 148. See Lawrence M. Frankel, Rethinking the Tunney Act: A Model for 
Judicial Review of Antitrust Consent Decrees, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 549, 570 
(2008) (explaining that the 2004 amendments “may not have represented a 
change in the law” and that they “did little to solve the Act’s underlying 
problems”). 
 149. See United States v. SBC Commc’ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 
2007) (summarizing the minimal influence of the amendments on Tunney Act 
caselaw). 
 150. 489 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007). 
 151. Id. at 11. 
 152. Id. 
 153. See id. at 36–37 (“The statutory language appears to overrule 
Massachusetts School of Law’s use of the ‘mockery’ standard of review.”). 
 154. See id. at 38–40 (concluding that “nothing in the text or legislative 
history of the 2004 amendments undermines [Microsoft’s] reasoning”). 
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Therefore, Congress’s effort to reanimate an exacting 
judicial review through the 2004 amendments seems 
fruitless.155 As the judiciary’s consistently high level of agency 
deference and limited judicial review of consent decrees persist, 
“the DOJ can assure merging parties that pre-Tunney hearing 
consummation is fine because the chances of a court rejecting 
the consent decree are zero.”156 This eliminates the entire 
purpose of Tunney Act review.157 
IV.  THE TUNNEY ACT DEMANDS LESS AGENCY DEFERENCE 
The consent decree is an effective and commonly employed 
tool to achieve the goals of federal antitrust enforcement.158 
Motivations specific to both the DOJ and the merging parties, 
however, create the risk that consent decrees are being agreed 
upon not for their ability to advance the public interest, but to 
achieve these other motivations.159 The Tunney Act demands 
exacting review by the courts, which is critical to ensuring that 
only those consent decrees that serve the interests of the public 
are entered into force.160 
Until this point, however, the majority of courts have 
misinterpreted the congressional mandate in the Tunney Act to 
afford too much deference to the DOJ when engaging in the 
public interest review. Courts should confer a lower degree of 
deference to the DOJ when engaging in Tunney Act public 
 
 155. See Bush, supra note 123, at 123 (“Review, or more precisely lack of 
review, of consent decrees continued as if the Tunney Act amendment had not 
passed.”). 
 156. Id. at 114. 
 157. See 1973 Tunney Act Hearings, supra note 15, at 452 (remarks by Sen. 
John V. Tunney and Sen. Edward Gurney) (explaining that Congress enacted 
the Tunney Act to charge the judiciary with independent review to ensure that 
inadequate consent decrees are not entered into force). 
 158. See ROGERS ET AL., supra note 2, at 42 (noting that 80 percent of 
antitrust litigation is settled and most of those settlements are achieved by 
consent decree). 
 159. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 160. See 1973 Tunney Act Hearings, supra note 15, at 449 (remarks by Sen. 
John V. Tunney and Sen. Edward Gurney) (stating that the public interest 
review charges the judiciary with “an independent duty to assure itself that 
entry of the decree will serve the public generally”). 
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interest review for three reasons: (1) less agency deference is the 
correct reading of the statute and the statute’s legislative 
history, (2) less agency deference does not pose an 
unconstitutional imbalance between the judicial and executive 
branches, and (3) less agency deference is crucial for containing 
harmful effects of anticompetitive mergers. 
A.  Less Agency Deference is the Correct Reading of the Statute 
and the Legislative History161 
Congress drafted the Tunney Act so the judiciary would 
play an active, nondeferential role in the antitrust settlement 
process.162 This arose from concerns regarding the DOJ’s 
settling of major antitrust litigation through consent decrees 
with little to no judicial oversight.163 For the purposes of this 
Note, a comparative analysis of the legislative histories and 
statutory frameworks of the important antitrust statutes 
through which the FTC and DOJ operate is beneficial. This 
subpart compares the FTC and DOJ through two lenses: (1) the 
DOJ as the prosecutor of antitrust laws versus the FTC’s role as 
an independent, expert adjudicator,164 and (2) the divergent 
consent decree procedures between the two agencies.165 The 
distinctions that exist between the FTC and DOJ are not 
accidental on the part of Congress, and they support this Note’s 
conclusion that Congress enacted the Tunney Act to require an 
exacting judicial review of the DOJ’s consent decrees.166 
 
 161. See Savin, supra note 58, at 364 (arguing that the Act’s legislative 
history “reveal[s] a clear mandate for critical and nondeferential judicial 
review of proposed consent decrees”). 
 162. See 1973 Tunney Act Hearings, supra note 15, at 449 (remarks by Sen. 
John V. Tunney and Sen. Edward Gurney) (“The court is not to operate simply 
as a rubber stamp, placing an imprimatur upon whatever is placed before it 
by the parties. Rather it has an independent duty to assure itself that entry of 
the decree will serve the public generally.” (emphasis added)). 
 163. See id. (stating that “[c]oncern has been renewed about the standards 
and the safeguards which apply when the stakes are high” and the stakes are 
high for antitrust). 
 164. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 165. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 166. See Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-237, 118 Stat. 661 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
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First, because the DOJ is the federal government’s 
prosecutorial body and is afforded wide jurisdiction to prosecute 
both civil and criminal laws (including criminal antitrust 
statutes), courts have misinterpreted the Tunney Act and its 
legislative history to account for deference in the form of 
prosecutorial discretion in administering Tunney Act review of 
civil consent decrees.167 
Second, because the DOJ is a non-expert, executive agency 
(in contrast to the FTC, which is an expert, independent 
agency), legislative history reveals understandable skepticism 
regarding the DOJ’s ability to appropriately settle antitrust 
claims by consent decree.168 As a result of this skepticism, 
Congress believed that independent judicial approval (as 
opposed to the FTC’s current process, which allows for internal 
approval and a mechanism for external judicial review only on 
appeal) was necessary to ensure that the DOJ’s settlement of 
antitrust litigation by consent decree serves the public 
interest.169 Thus, the procedural distinction between the FTC 
and DOJ reveals a deliberate judicial approval function in 
protection of the public interest in DOJ consent decrees. 
1.  The DOJ as Antitrust Prosecutor 
Courts restrain their Tunney Act review by invoking the 
doctrine of prosecutorial discretion.170 Prosecutorial discretion 
likely gained traction in Tunney Act jurisprudence because of 
two DOJ-specific principles: (1) the DOJ is the federal 
 
§ 16(e)(1)) (publishing a congressional finding that courts should conduct the 
review to advance the public interest). 
 167. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 168. See 1973 Tunney Act Hearings, supra note 15, at 453 (remarks by Sen. 
John V. Tunney and Sen. Edward Gurney) (providing that the public interest 
review is meant to identify the inevitable instances when the DOJ’s judgment 
was unreasonable). 
 169. See id. at 452 (remarks by Sen. John V. Tunney and Sen. Edward 
Gurney) (stating that independent judicial review of a consent decree is 
necessary to ensure that the DOJ’s judgment in agreeing to the settlement was 
appropriate). 
 170. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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government’s “prosecutor,”171 and is therefore associated with 
the well-established doctrine of deference to “prosecutorial 
discretion,”172 and (2) the DOJ enforces antitrust laws in both 
the civil and criminal contexts,173 the latter of which allows 
judges to extend the DOJ’s prosecutorial discretion to the realm 
of federal antitrust enforcement.174 By contrast, there is no such 
discussion with regard to deference to the FTC under the 
doctrine of prosecutorial discretion.175 
Deference to prosecutorial discretion is well-accepted 
because it promotes flexibility and adaptability to case-specific 
factors in prosecutorial decision-making.176 It is especially 
well-established in the criminal context, with some sources 
acknowledging the doctrine exclusively in this setting.177 
Because the DOJ is charged with executing the laws under the 
constitutional powers vested to the President, courts apply 
prosecutorial discretion to the agency.178 Moreover, the DOJ has 
 
 171. See About the Office, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://perma.cc/S2PM-
GNUQ (last updated July 17, 2018) (“The Judiciary Act of 1789 created the 
Office of the Attorney General which evolved over the years into the head of 
the Department of Justice and chief law enforcement officer of the Federal 
Government.”). 
 172. See Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of 
Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2 (1971) (“Prosecutors in 
Anglo-American legal systems, both as a matter of theory and in practice, have 
considerable discretion in making their decisions.”). 
 173. See ROGERS ET AL., supra note 2, at 42–43 (noting that the DOJ has 
jurisdiction to prosecute both civil and criminal provisions in antitrust 
statutes). 
 174. See Donald I. Baker, To Indict or Not to Indict: Prosecutorial 
Discretion in Sherman Act Enforcement, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 405, 408–09 
(discussing the DOJ’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion in bringing criminal 
indictments under the Sherman Act). 
 175. See Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 611–13 (1946) (stating that 
the FTC has “wide discretion in its choice of a remedy” but making no mention 
of the doctrine of prosecutorial discretion). 
 176. See Abrams, supra note 172, at 2–3 (summarizing the advantages of 
prosecutorial discretion in the legal system). 
 177. See Review, Prosecutorial Discretion Part II: Preliminary 
Proceedings, 34 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 197, 199 (2005) [hereinafter 
Prosecutorial Discretion] (“Courts recognize broad discretion to initiate and 
conduct criminal prosecutions . . . .”). 
 178. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (“The 
Attorney General and United States Attorneys retain ‘broad discretion’ to 
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jurisdiction to enforce the antitrust laws by issuing criminal 
indictments,179 which reinforces the applicability of 
prosecutorial discretion to the DOJ.180 
The applicability of prosecutorial discretion to the DOJ with 
respect to the Tunney Act fails, however, for two reasons. First, 
the doctrine of prosecutorial discretion risks inconsistency, 
uncertainty, and arbitrariness.181 In the Tunney Act context, 
those risks produce cheap decrees, which is precisely what the 
drafters envisioned the statute’s judicial review mechanism 
would protect against.182 Second, though the DOJ indeed has 
jurisdiction to enforce the criminal provisions of federal 
antitrust laws, Tunney Act review is a purely civil inquiry.183 As 
such, the judiciary’s extension of prosecutorial discretion to the 
Tunney Act is misplaced.184 
2.  The Distinct Procedural Mechanisms for DOJ and FTC 
Consent Decrees Reveal Congress’s Desire to Impose an Active 
Judicial Review 
Both agencies use consent decrees,185 but the FTC and DOJ 
follow different procedures to pursue enforcement of their 
 
enforce the Nation’s criminal laws.” (citations omitted)); infra note 245 and 
accompanying text. 
 179. See ROGERS ET AL., supra note 2, at 42 (noting that the DOJ has 
authority to enforce the criminal provisions of the antitrust statutes). 
 180. See, e.g., United States v. Bonnet-Grullon, 212 F.3d 692, 701 (2d Cir. 
2000) (“It is well established that the decision as to what federal charges to 
bring against any given suspect is within the province of the Executive Branch 
of the government.”). 
 181. See id. at 3 (noting the “competing tension between the need in 
prosecutorial decision-making for certainty, consistency, and an absence of 
arbitrariness on the one hand, and the need for flexibility, sensitivity, and 
adaptability on the other”). 
 182. See 1973 Tunney Act Hearings, supra note 15, at 449 (remarks by Sen. 
John V. Tunney and Sen. Edward Gurney) (explaining that the purpose of the 
public interest judicial review mechanism is to protect against the “bad or 
inadequate” consent decrees); see also infra Part IV.C. 
 183. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (limiting the consent judgment process to only 
civil proceedings that the DOJ brings). 
 184. See infra Part IV.B (analogizing the DOJ’s role in the Tunney Act 
consent decree process to the criminal plea agreement context, which similarly 
involves a judicial approval requirement). 
 185. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text. 
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decrees, and the caselaw pertaining to each procedure is 
distinct.186 The Tunney Act does not apply to FTC consent 
decrees.187 Instead, FTC consent decrees are approved or denied 
by the commission itself,188 and it enjoys “wide discretion” in its 
decision to settle an antitrust violation by consent decree.189 
DOJ consent decrees, on the other hand, require approval 
by a federal district court judge pursuant to the Tunney Act.190 
The Tunney Act requires judges to determine whether the DOJ’s 
negotiated consent decree “is in the public interest” prior to 
approving it.191 Antitrust scholars note a distinction between the 
court’s role in judicial review (FTC) and judicial approval (DOJ) 
of a consent decree.192 Judicial approval is a mandatory part of 
the Tunney Act procedure, while judicial review is a device by 
which a party may seek an appeal of an already final consent 
decree.193 
This procedural distinction between the two agencies—
principally, the FTC’s lack of a mandatory judicial approval 
mechanism—is telling. Recognizing the “specialized, 
 
 186. See ROGERS ET AL., supra note 2, at 42 (describing the distinctions 
between FTC and DOJ consent decree approval procedure). 
 187. See id. (comparing the approval procedure for DOJ consent decrees 
and FTC consent decrees). 
 188. See id. (“[T]he Commission both proposes orders and 
then . . . approves them in final form.”). 
 189. See Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 611–13 (1946) (“The 
Commission has wide discretion in its choice of a remedy deemed adequate to 
cope with the unlawful practices in this area of trade and commerce.”). 
 190. See ROGERS ET AL., supra note 2, at 42 (explaining the Tunney Act 
requirements that the DOJ must satisfy in seeking approval of a consent 
decree). 
 191. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)(1) (“Before entering any consent judgment 
proposed by the United States under this section, the court shall determine 
that the entry of such judgment is in the public interest.”); see also supra notes 
98–100 and accompanying text. 
 192. See ROSCH, supra note 66, at 3 n.6 (distinguishing “judicial approval,” 
which “requires that a federal district court approve a settlement as being in 
the public interest[,] . . . from ‘judicial review,’ which merely refers to an 
appeal or petition for review [of a final FTC settlement] to a federal court of 
appeals”). 
 193. See id. at 3 (stating that the FTC “does not have . . . a procedure for 
judicial approval—unlike consent decrees entered into by the [DOJ]”). 
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experienced judgment”194 of the FTC, courts repeatedly conclude 
that the agency retains the “primary responsibility for 
fashioning orders.”195 Courts must also give “wide discretion”196 
to the FTC in its crafting of the appropriate consent decree.197 
Congress did not implement this procedural scheme 
inadvertently.198 Unlike the DOJ, Congress created the FTC as 
“the expert body to determine what remedy is necessary to 
eliminate” the identified antitrust violations.199 In FTC v. 
Cement Institute,200 the Supreme Court spoke directly to 
congressional intent: 
Congress when it passed the [Federal] Trade Commission 
Act felt that courts needed the assistance of men trained to 
combat monopolistic practices in the framing of judicial 
decrees in antitrust litigation. Congress envisioned a 
commission trained in this type of work by experience in 
carrying out the functions imposed upon it.201 
 
 194. See Moog Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411, 413 (1958) (stating that 
“it is ordinarily not for courts to modify ancillary features of a valid 
Commission order” because the FTC “is called upon to exercise its specialized, 
experienced judgment”). 
 195. FTC v. Nat’l Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 429 (1957). 
 196. See Jacob Siegel Co., 327 U.S. at 611–13 (“The Commission has wide 
discretion in its choice of a remedy deemed adequate to cope with the unlawful 
practices in this area of trade and commerce.”). 
 197. See Nat’l Lead, 352 U.S. at 428–29 (stating that “Congress had placed 
the primary responsibility for fashioning orders upon the Commission” in 
summarizing the U.S. Supreme Court’s deferential approach to reviewing FTC 
consent decrees). 
 198. See FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 726 (1948) (“There is a special 
reason, however, why courts should not lightly modify the Commission’s 
orders made in efforts to safeguard a competitive economy.”). 
 199. See Jacob Siegel Co., 327 U.S. at 612 (explaining the role of the FTC 
in enforcing antitrust laws); Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 
624 (1935) (“The commission is to be non-partisan; and it must, from the very 
nature of its duties, act with entire impartiality. It is charged with the 
enforcement of no policy except the policy of the law. Its duties are neither 
political nor executive, but predominantly quasi-judicial and 
quasi-legislative . . . .”). 
 200. 333 U.S. 683 (1948). 
 201. Id. at 726. 
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Thus, Congress foresaw the FTC filling an expert role in 
advising on antitrust decree concerns for the courts and, 
notably, for the DOJ.202 
The FTC filling such a role is embedded in the text of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act itself.203 The Federal Trade 
Commission Act provides that a court—after the end of 
testimony in a lawsuit brought by the DOJ under the antitrust 
laws—may “refer said suit to the commission, as a master in 
chancery, to ascertain and report an appropriate form of decree 
therein.”204 The court may adopt or reject the FTC’s report as it 
deems appropriate.205 Congress viewed this advisory power as 
an important one: it “will bring both to the Attorney General and 
to the court the aid of special expert experience and training in 
matters regarding which neither the Department of Justice nor 
the courts can be expected to be proficient.”206 
Conversely, Congress implemented a mandatory judicial 
review function as part of the Tunney Act for the DOJ because 
of the “major antitrust policy [that] can be implemented through 
consent decrees.”207 Out of a concern that the DOJ was 
improperly disposing of antitrust lawsuits by consent decree,208 
Congress deemed the mandatory judicial review function 
necessary “to exact greater judicial and public scrutiny of 
antitrust settlements in suits brought by the government.”209 
 
 202. See id. at 726–27 (summarizing the FTC’s expert role and the Federal 
Trade Commission Act’s provision that allows for assistance to the DOJ). 
 203. See 15 U.S.C. § 47 (explaining the interaction between the FTC, 
courts, and the DOJ regarding consent decrees). 
 204. Id. 
 205. See id. (“[T]he court may adopt or reject such report, in whole or in 
part, and enter such decree as the nature of the case may in its judgment 
require.”). 
 206. S. REP. NO. 63-597, at 12 (1914) (discussing the legislative proposal to 
create the FTC). 
 207. See ROGERS ET AL., supra note 2, at 42 (explaining the DOJ consent 
decree process). 
 208. See Savin, supra note 58, at 377 (“The elaborate procedures created 
by the Tunney Act are designed to provide an opportunity to correct the errors 
of the Justice Department, an opportunity wasted by a deferential court.”). 
 209. See id. at 366 (explaining why the judicial review was imposed). 
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The DOJ is firmly rooted in the executive branch.210 The 
Attorney General heads the DOJ211 and serves as “the hand of 
the President;”212 the Attorney General aids the President in 
executing the laws under the Take Care Clause.213 The Attorney 
General is appointed by the President,214 serves as a member of 
the President’s cabinet and, as a result, may be removed at will 
and without cause by the President.215 The DOJ Antitrust 
Division’s Assistant Attorney General, who is also appointed by 
the President,216 reports directly to the Attorney General.217 The 
Assistant Attorney General determines DOJ antitrust policy 
and internal prosecutorial decision-making.218 As a result, the 
Assistant Attorney General’s opinions on antitrust enforcement 
play a major role in determining which antitrust cases the 
agency pursues.219 Though the Assistant Attorney General is 
often well-qualified in the field of antitrust,220 she operates as a 
 
 210. See 28 U.S.C. § 501 (“The Department of Justice is an executive 
department of the United States at the seat of Government.”). 
 211. See id. § 503 (“The Attorney General is the head of the Department of 
Justice.”). 
 212. United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965) (“The Attorney 
General is the hand of the President in taking care that the laws of the United 
States in legal proceedings and in the prosecution of offenses, be faithfully 
executed.”). 
 213. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 5 (“[The President] shall take care that 
the laws be faithfully executed . . . .”). 
 214. See 28 U.S.C. § 503 (“The President shall appoint, by and with the 
advice and consent of the Senate, an Attorney General of the United States.”). 
 215. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 163 (1926) (concluding that 
executive officers that are “appoint[ed] by the President with the consent of 
the Senate . . . are subject to removal by the President alone, and any 
legislation to the contrary must fall as in conflict with the Constitution”). 
 216. 28 U.S.C. § 506 (“The President shall appoint, by and with the advice 
and consent of the Senate, 11 Assistant Attorneys General, who shall assist 
the Attorney General in the performance of his duties.”). 
 217. See ROGERS ET AL., supra note 2, at 39 (describing the leadership 
structure of the DOJ’s antitrust arm). 
 218. See id. (“Division policy and prosecutorial discretion are set by the 
Assistant Attorney General . . . .”). 
 219. See id. at 39–40 (summarizing the drastically different approaches to 
antitrust enforcement depending on who held the position of Assistant 
Attorney General at the time); see also supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text. 
 220. For example, William Baer, Assistant Attorney General under the 
Obama Administration, “is a leader of the antitrust bar” and was previously 
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single decision-making authority and is directly accountable to 
the political motivations of the President.221 
A recent example of potential political influence was the 
DOJ’s uncharacteristic efforts to block a vertical merger: the 
now-consummated AT&T-Time Warner merger in 2017.222 
Neither the DOJ nor the FTC had brought a lawsuit to enjoin a 
vertical merger in over forty years.223 Nonetheless, the DOJ 
proceeded with litigation to enjoin the AT&T-Time Warner 
deal.224 The DOJ was unable to cite to any recent caselaw to 
support its position.225 The D.C. District Court, ruling against 
the DOJ, concluded that the merger could proceed as planned, 
and the D.C. Circuit affirmed.226 Reports indicate that Donald 
Trump’s outspoken opposition to the merger influenced the 
DOJ’s decision to challenge the deal.227 
 
the Director of the Bureau of Competition at the FTC. See STACEY ANNE 
MAHONEY, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT UNDER PRESIDENT OBAMA: WHERE HAVE 
WE BEEN AND WHERE ARE WE GOING? 2–3 (2013), https://perma.cc/3HSW-
VQMZ (PDF) (referring to Baer as “extremely well regarded” and stating that 
he has enjoyed an “exceptionally successful career”). Christine Varney, Baer’s 
predecessor, is a leading US antitrust lawyer and the only person to have 
served both as Assistant Attorney General and as a Commissioner at the FTC. 
Lawyers: Christine A. Varney, CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE LLP, https://
perma.cc/2HJZ-G95T (summarizing Christine Varney’s antitrust expertise). 
 221. See Burton Raffel, Presidential Removal Power: The Role of the 
Supreme Court, 13 U. MIAMI L. REV. 69, 75 (1958) (“The principal tool left to 
the President for securing the loyalty, responsibility and control of the officers 
of the government is discretionary removal power.”). 
 222. See James B. Stewart, AT&T-Time Warner Decision Shows Need to 
Rethink Antitrust Laws, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2018), https://perma.cc/VR82-
TMTT (detailing the DOJ’s decision to sue to enjoin the merger between AT&T 
and Time Warner). 
 223. See id. (“The last time the government brought such a case was in 
1979.”). 
 224. See Complaint at 2, United States v. AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161 
(D.D.C. 2018), No. 1:17-cv-02511, ECF No. 1 (stating that the United States 
brought a civil action to enjoin the merger because it would substantially 
lessen competition). 
 225. See Stewart, supra note 221 (“[T]he Justice Department, which sued 
to prevent the deal, could not cite a single recent precedent for blocking it.”). 
 226. See United States v. AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 254 (D.D.C. 
2018), aff’d, 916 F.3d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (denying the DOJ’s request to 
enjoin the proposed merger). 
 227. See Jane Mayer, The Making of the Fox News White House, NEW 
YORKER (Mar. 4, 2019), https://perma.cc/ZG58-KVDD (reporting that “Trump 
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By contrast, Congress structured the FTC to exist as an 
independent agency, insulated from politics in the executive 
branch.228 Thus, the FTC’s consent decrees require public 
interest review by the commission itself, which is composed of a 
five-member panel of bipartisan, antitrust experts.229 The DOJ’s 
unilateral authority differs greatly from a bipartisan panel of 
expert commissioners, who, for example, are not subject to the 
President’s at will removal powers.230 Congress, therefore, was 
understandably concerned that the consolidated power 
structure inherent to the DOJ faces a greater risk of creating 
outcomes contrary to the public interest.231 
B.  Less Agency Deference Does Not Pose an Unconstitutional 
Imbalance Between the Judicial and Executive Branches 
Courts consistently cite constitutional separation of powers 
concerns in support of narrowing Tunney Act judicial review.232 
Judicial deference owed to government agencies is part of a 
larger discussion regarding its constitutionality—namely, the 
debate surrounding Chevron233 deference and the caselaw that 
espouses similar principles.234 Independent of the outcome of 
 
ordered Gary Cohn, then the director of the National Economic Council, to 
pressure the [DOJ] to intervene”); see also Hadas Gold, Report: Trump Asked 
Gary Cohn to Block AT&T-Time Warner Merger, CNN, https://perma.cc
/3KQA-73B7 (last updated Mar. 4, 2019, 4:53 PM) (stating that “Trump’s 
animosity towards the merger is no secret,” as he “repeatedly talked about 
wanting to block it on the campaign trail and in office”). 
 228. See Sunstein, supra note 10 (explaining that there are two types of 
government agencies—executive and independent—and noting that the DOJ 
is executive and the FTC is independent). 
 229. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 41 (stating that the 
commission is composed of five commissioners, with no more than three of the 
commissioners being members of the same political party). 
 230. See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 632 (1935) 
(holding that the president cannot remove an FTC commissioner “during the 
prescribed term for which the officer is appointed, except for one or more of the 
causes named in the applicable statute”). 
 231. See supra notes 206–209 and accompanying text. 
 232. See supra notes 102–105 and accompanying text. 
 233. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984). 
 234. See id. at 844 (“We have long recognized that considerable weight 
should be accorded to an executive department’s construction of a statutory 
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that debate,235 courts’ use of a lower degree of agency deference 
does not implicate constitutional concerns. This conclusion is 
supported by analogy: it is not a constitutional concern in the 
federal criminal plea agreement context, which involves a 
similar process.236 
The procedural requirements to which the DOJ must 
adhere when entering a federal criminal plea agreement and the 
requirements to seek entry of a proposed consent decree 
remedying an antitrust violation are remarkably similar.237 
While the Tunney Act mandates the procedure that the 
government must follow to enforce civil consent decrees,238 Rule 
11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (the “Rules”) 
governs the process by which the government may enter a 
federal criminal plea agreement.239 
The plea agreement and consent decree both come after the 
agency has already exercised its “prosecutorial discretion” in 
bringing the complaint or indictment and after its subsequent 
 
scheme it is entrusted to administer . . . .”); see also John F. Manning, 
Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of 
Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 613 (1996) (noting that “Chevron 
deference has preoccupied administrative law scholarship in a way few issues 
ever have”). 
 235. See Manning, supra note 234, at 613 (“Exhaustive academic 
commentary has scrutinized Chevron’s legitimacy, and explored the seemingly 
innumerable questions that arise from its application.”). 
 236. See Bush, supra note 123, at 114 (“[T]his setting is no different than 
the countless thousands of plea bargains that are handled in the criminal 
context. In those instances, courts have broad discretion to reject plea 
bargains. . . . Prosecutorial discretion is preserved, as are the powers of Article 
III courts.”). 
 237. Compare FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3) (providing that the court must 
accept a plea agreement before it is entered), with 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)(1) 
(requiring that the court make a public interest determination in deciding 
whether to enter the consent decree). In addition, scholars note the similarity 
between the Tunney Act’s judicial approval requirement and the judicial 
approval requirement for shareholder derivative suits in Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23.1. See Savin, supra note 58, at 380–82 (“Neither the Tunney Act 
nor Rule 23 intended for the reviewing court merely to rubber-stamp whatever 
settlement was proposed by the parties.”). 
 238. 15 U.S.C. § 16 (requiring that the DOJ follow certain steps when 
seeking enforcement of a consent decree). 
 239. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (providing the procedural rules regarding the 
negotiation and entry of a plea agreement). 
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decision not to continue prosecuting the charge or litigating the 
claim.240 The three phases of the plea agreement process are 
analogous to consent decree approval under the Tunney Act: (1) 
the plea agreement negotiation that occurs between the 
parties,241 (2) the submission of the proposed plea agreement to 
the court,242 and (3) the court’s review and ultimate judgment.243 
The negotiation stage—the first phase of the plea 
agreement process—involves the government’s exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion.244 The court’s absence from this phase 
is appropriate; courts routinely conclude that judicial review is 
inappropriate where the executive branch is exercising its 
discretion in determining whether to pursue, dismiss, or settle 
charges.245 Such interference would constitute a violation of 
separation of powers and an infringement upon the 
government’s prosecutorial discretion.246 This notion is 
expressly codified in the Rules: a court cannot participate in plea 
agreement negotiations that occur between the defendant and 
the government.247 This is also captured by the Tunney Act: the 
 
 240. See Bush, supra note 123, at 128 (describing the point at which plea 
agreements and consent decrees come into play). 
 241. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1) (discussing the procedure for plea 
agreement negotiations). 
 242. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(2) (mandating disclosure of the proposed 
plea agreement to the court). 
 243. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(4) (providing the structure for judicial 
review and approval of the plea agreement). 
 244. See Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 177, at 199 (explaining that 
prosecutorial discretion involves the prosecutor’s “far-reaching authority to 
decide whether to investigate, grant immunity, negotiate a plea bargain, or 
dismiss charges”). 
 245. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (“The 
Attorney General and United States Attorneys retain ‘broad discretion’ to 
enforce the Nation’s criminal laws.” (citations omitted)); Newman v. United 
States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (stating that “few subjects” are less 
suited for judicial review than the executive branch exercising its prosecutorial 
discretion). 
 246. See United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965) (“[A]s an 
incident of the constitutional separation of powers, . . . the courts are not to 
interfere with the free exercise of the discretionary power of the attorneys of 
the United States in their control over criminal prosecutions.”). 
 247. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1) (“An attorney for the government and the 
defendant’s attorney . . . may discuss and reach a plea agreement. The court 
must not participate in these discussions.”). 
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parties only submit a proposed consent decree to the court once 
the terms within it have been agreed upon.248 
Once the negotiations result in a plea agreement, the 
government must then offer it in open court—the second phase 
of the process.249 At this point, the court’s involvement is 
permissible because this phase triggers a judicial function; the 
government has exercised its prosecutorial discretion in 
deciding to reach a plea agreement with the defendant, and then 
submits it to the court for approval.250 The Tunney Act mandates 
a similar procedure: the government must file the consent 
decree with the court and publish it in the Federal Register “at 
least sixty days prior to the effective date of such judgment.”251 
This phase explicitly marks the point at which prosecutorial 
discretion ends and judicial review begins.252 
In the final stage of the plea agreement process, 
responsibility shifts to the court to review the plea agreement as 
part of its judicial function and render a decision on it.253 The 
court in the criminal plea agreement context, like in the Tunney 
 
 248. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (explaining that the court’s involvement in the 
consent decree does not begin until the parties submit a proposed consent 
decree to the court). 
 249. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(2) (“The parties must disclose the plea 
agreement in open court when the plea is offered . . . .”). This rule also seems 
to implicate the entrenched notion that criminal justice should be adjudicated 
in the public eye. See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 
(holding that “the right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees 
of the First Amendment”). Interestingly, the same concern arose in the 
legislative debate surrounding the Tunney Act procedures. See 1957 Consent 
Decree Hearings, supra note 62, at 3 (stating that criticisms of the consent 
decree process prior to Tunney Act enactment stem from “the fact that the 
entire process is surrounded by secrecy”). 
 250. See Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 177, at 197–99 (explaining 
that prosecutorial discretion involves the government’s power to determine 
how to proceed with a case). 
 251. 15 U.S.C. § 16(b). 
 252. See Bush, supra note 123, at 128 (“Although the DOJ certainly has 
the right to dismiss a civil or criminal antitrust complaint or negotiate a 
settlement with any party, the right of prosecutorial discretion ends when a 
court is asked to exercise its power to enter a consent decree.”). 
 253. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)(A) (“[T]he court may accept the 
agreement, reject it, or defer a decision until the court has reviewed the 
presentence report.”). 
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Act,254 must approve the parties’ settlement proposal prior to it 
taking effect.255 This is a “judicial function”256 and does not 
implicate separation of powers concerns.257 The same principles 
apply in the Tunney Act context.258 Responsibility shifts from 
the executive branch to the court to review the consent decree 
and render a decision on it.259 
This analogy reveals that—in conferring an inappropriate 
amount of deference to the DOJ—courts are failing to 
distinguish between the executive’s role in negotiating a 
proposed settlement and the court’s subsequent role in 
reviewing the consent decree and granting its entry.260 The 
Tunney Act prescribes a two-step process that involves the 
participation of two branches of government performing their 
distinct roles.261 
In fact, the Constitution’s separation of powers system 
demands this distinct role for the judiciary.262 The judiciary’s 
 
 254. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)(1) (requiring that the court make a public 
interest determination in deciding whether to enter the consent decree). 
 255. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(4) (“If the court rejects the plea 
agreement, . . . the agreed disposition will be included in the judgment.”). 
 256. See Savin, supra note 58, at 377–78 (“Although negotiations involve 
administrative decisions by the Justice Department, a court’s entry of a 
consent decree is a judicial function.”). 
 257. See Bush, supra note 123, at 114 (explaining that both prosecutorial 
discretion and the power of the courts are preserved during the plea agreement 
process). 
 258. See id. (“[The Tunney Act] setting is no different than the countless 
thousands of plea bargains that are handled in the criminal context.”). 
 259. See id. at 127 (stating that “the act of deciding to enter a decree” is a 
judicial function and not an executive branch function “entrusted solely to the 
discretion of the DOJ”); United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 115 (1932) 
(“We reject the argument . . . that a decree entered upon consent is to be 
treated as a contract and not as a judicial act.”). The entry of a consent decree 
as a judicial act is a long-held principle that predates the Tunney Act. See 
Phillips, Jr., supra note 83, at 44 (explaining that by 1928 the U.S. Supreme 
Court had established that the entry of a consent decree is a judicial act). 
 260. See supra notes 249–259 and accompanying text. 
 261. See Savin, supra note 58, at 377–78 (“Entry of a consent decree is a 
judicial act, and therefore the decree is subject to the court’s inherent equitable 
power to refuse to enter any judgment not in the public interest.”). 
 262. See Bush, supra note 123, at 129 (“Because the entry of a decree is an 
inherently judicial function, it cannot be the case that the Court should be 
obligated to defer to the DOJ . . . .”). 
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abdication of an exacting review through deference to the DOJ, 
therefore, “could itself represent an unconstitutional 
infringement on judicial power.”263 Moreover, if this Note were 
to extend the concept of the DOJ’s prosecutorial discretion in 
Tunney Act review and frame it as a Chevron inquiry, this too 
would fail by analogy to the criminal plea agreement context.264 
The U.S. Supreme Court concludes that agency deference is 
inapt for criminal statutes.265 
Therefore, analogy to the criminal plea agreement process 
reveals a process of judicial review that is consistent with the 
requirements set forth in the Constitution.266 Courts should 
eliminate the artificial restraints that it has imposed on its 
Tunney Act review by acknowledging that deference to the DOJ 
is inappropriate when the court is charged by statute with an 
independent duty to approve or deny a settlement. 
C.  Less Agency Deference is Crucial to Containing Harmful 
Effects of Anticompetitive Mergers 
When a reviewing court affords too much deference to the 
DOJ, it removes the procedural protections Congress designed 
to ensure that only those antitrust settlements that are in the 
public interest are approved.267 Only a scrutinizing, 
 
 263. See Savin, supra note 58, at 377 n.102 (“Such a denial would arguably 
prevent the court from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned function of 
enforcing the laws of the United States as a court of equity.”). 
 264. See supra note 234 and accompanying text. 
 265. See Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169, 191 (2014) (“[C]riminal 
laws are for courts, not for the Government, to construe.”); Gutierrez-Brizuela 
v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1155 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citing 
Abramski, 573 U.S. at 191) 
The Supreme Court has expressly instructed us not to apply 
Chevron deference when an agency seeks to interpret a criminal 
statute. Why? Because, we are seemingly told, doing so would 
violate the Constitution by forcing the judiciary to abdicate the job 
of saying what the law is and preventing courts from exercising 
independent judgment in the interpretation of statutes. 
 266. See supra notes 249–259 and accompanying text. 
 267. See 1973 Tunney Act Hearings, supra note 15, at 449 (remarks by Sen. 
John V. Tunney and Sen. Edward Gurney) (explaining that the purpose of the 
independent judicial review is to protect against the “bad or inadequate” 
consent decrees). 
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non-deferential review can decipher between settlements that 
advance the public interest versus those that were agreed upon 
based on objectionable motivations—cheap decrees.268 
Cheap decrees269 undercut the entire utility of enforcement 
by settlement and serve as a primary example of why the 
Tunney Act warrants independent, non-deferential review.270 
Congress imposed a mandatory judicial approval mechanism in 
the Tunney Act to prevent cheap decrees like those described 
above,271 and robust judicial review prevents those cheap 
decrees.272 Therefore, it is incumbent upon courts to reanimate 
their role in Tunney Act review to thoroughly assess the merits 
of consent decrees prior to their entry into force. 
V.  A PATH FORWARD 
In one of the most recent examples of Tunney Act 
jurisprudence, the D.C. District Court rejected the notion of 
“rubber stamp” review in CVS’s acquisition of Aetna.273 
Highlighting the importance of an exacting review, the CVS 
Health court stated, “Indeed, if the Tunney Act is to mean 
anything, it surely must mean that no court should rubberstamp 
a consent decree approving the merger of one of the largest 
companies in the United States and the nation’s third-largest 
health-insurance company, simply because the Government 
requests it!”274 
Because of the merger’s far-reaching effects,275 the court 
conducted hearings and received extensive briefings to address 
 
 268. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 269. See supra notes 64–69. 
 270. See ROSCH, supra note 66, at 10 (stating the negative effects of cheap 
decrees). 
 271. See supra Part IV.A. 
 272. See ROSCH, supra note 66, at 9–11 (explaining the concept of “cheap 
decrees” and their detrimental effects). 
 273. See United States v. CVS Health Corp., 407 F. Supp. 3d 45, 48 (D.D.C. 
2019) (stating that “with so much at stake, the congressionally mandated 
public interest inquiry must be thorough”). 
 274. Id. at 48 (citation omitted). 
 275. See id. (“Its effects, for better or for worse, will be felt by millions of 
consumers.”). 
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the concerns voiced by industry participants.276 In the opinion, 
the court noted particular concerns with the DOJ’s 
“perfunctory” response to the large volume of comments that the 
DOJ received during the mandatory notice and comment period 
and the unsubstantiated confidence with which the DOJ 
defended the consent decree in the responses.277 
Notably, the court clarified—and, in so doing, potentially 
broadened—the D.C. Circuit’s holding in Microsoft, which 
provided that the reviewing court’s inquiry under the Tunney 
Act is limited to the claims contained in the DOJ’s complaint.278 
Criticizing the DOJ’s attempt to use Microsoft to limit the scope 
of the review, Judge Leon stated that the arguments “severely 
understate the permissible scope of a Tunney Act review.”279 The 
court distinguished between claims and harms: Microsoft stands 
for the proposition that the reviewing court cannot “evaluate 
claims that the government did not make,”280 but the D.C. 
Circuit never suggested that “allegations in the complaint are 
the only harms courts may consider in a Tunney Act review.”281 
 
 276. See id. (stating that the record was “meaningfully supplemented by 
the briefs and testimony presented by the parties and amici curiae”); Brent 
Kendall, Judge Approves Settlement Allowing CVS-Aetna Merger, WALL ST. J. 
(Sept. 4, 2019, 7:30 PM), https://perma.cc/ZQ8G-3FWK (explaining that, “in a 
first for a court review of a government merger settlement,” Judge Leon heard 
live testimony from third parties). 
 277. See CVS Health, 407 F. Supp. 3d at 50 (“To say the least, [the DOJ’s] 
response left much to be desired. It is rife with conclusory assertions that 
merely reiterate the Government’s confidence in its proposed remedy, but shed 
little light on the reasons for that confidence.”). These steps are part of the 
procedural requirements set forth under the Tunney Act. See supra notes 
86– 91 and accompanying text. 
 278. See supra notes 124–128 and accompanying text. 
 279. See CVS Health, 407 F. Supp. 3d at 52–53 (stating that the DOJ relied 
on Microsoft to attempt to persuade the court that it should disregard the 
criticisms posed by the amici curiae as outside the review’s scope). 
 280. Id. at 53 (citing United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1451 
(D.C. Cir. 1995)). 
 281. See id. (stating that “such a holding would have contradicted the 
Tunney Act itself”); id. at 53–54 (“The Government’s suggestion here—that by 
narrowly drafting a complaint it can effectively force the Court to shut its eyes 
to the real-world impact of a proposed judgment—thus misconstrues 
Microsoft.”). 
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Judge Leon explained that such a holding would “strike[] at the 
heart of the Tunney Act’s very purpose.”282 
After a thorough review, the court ultimately approved the 
consent decree.283 A signal of change or an outlier among 
deferential precedent, Judge Leon’s hands-on review in United 
States v. CVS Health is a needed reanimation of the Tunney 
Act’s congressional mandate. As such, the D.C. Circuit should 
adopt Judge Leon’s claims versus harms distinction for the 
Tunney Act’s scope of review and clarify its holding from 
Microsoft to reflect such language.284 In doing so, the D.C. 
Circuit should make clear that courts are not prevented from 
engaging in a meaningful review of a proposed consent decree 
with respect to the harms that may accrue with the public as a 
result of the merger.285 As the court states, “Neither the statute, 
nor Microsoft, supports such a meaning.”286 
CONCLUSION 
A court’s deferential review of proposed consent decrees 
under the Tunney Act dilutes the independent judicial review 
mechanism designed by Congress to a mere “rubber stamp” 
process.287 By simply deferring to the DOJ and imposing 
artificial constraints on its scope of review, courts are unable to 
conduct a meaningful review of the effects of a proposed merger 
on the public. Less agency deference, therefore, is critical to 
ensuring that the goals of the Tunney Act are met. Without such 
 
 282. Id. at 54. 
 283. See id. (granting the government’s motion to enter the proposed 
consent decree because the settlement satisfied public interest review under 
the Tunney Act). 
 284. See United States v. CVS Health Corp., 407 F. Supp. 3d 45, 52–53 
(D.D.C. 2019) (summarizing the court’s clarification of the Microsoft 
reasoning). 
 285. See id. at 54 (stating that “judicial evaluation of . . . alleged harms 
raises no constitutional issue”). 
 286. See id. (explaining that the DOJ has misinterpreted the D.C. Circuit 
precedent). 
 287. See 1973 Tunney Act Hearings, supra note 15, at 452 (remarks by Sen. 
John V. Tunney and Sen. Edward Gurney) (fearing that, absent the Tunney 
Act, the court “operate[s] simply as a rubber stamp”). 
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review, the goals embedded in the Tunney Act’s public interest 
provision are lost.288 
Courts should afford less deference to the DOJ when 
engaging in the Tunney Act’s public interest review and 
reanimate their statutorily mandated duty to independently 
determine whether allowing a merger to go forward on the terms 
contained within the decree is in the public interest. 
 
 
 288. See supra note 274 and accompanying text. 
